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Tinkering with the Student Speech Test: A Much Needed Update to the First Amendment 
Quandary for the Cyberbullying Epidemic  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: “SHE DESERVED TO KILL HERSELF…” 
 
The two minute, five second video, perhaps considered quaint at its actual date of 
filming, is today, instantly and eerily recognizable.  The YouTube embodiment, which has been 
taken down and reposted numerous times, boasts a monstrous amount of hits, well past the 
million mark.
1
  In a single camera shot, Jamey Rodemeyer’s big brown eyes lock focus with his 
computer camera.
2
  His shiny braces reflect off the screen and his dresser mirror behind him as 
he painfully, yet frequently, smiles through his video-narrative.  The Buffalo native had 
proclaimed himself as openly gay before he reached his teen years
3
 and was participating in an 
online video project called “It Gets Better”4 when he posted the aforementioned video-diary 
about his experiences.
5
  His peers responded negatively to the declaration and students posted 
messages of hate on his Facebook wall,
6
 Twitter account, and blog.
7
   
                                                          
1 Jamey Rodemeyer, It Gets Better, I promise!, YOUTUBE (May 4, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
Pb1CaGMdWk.  Jamey’s YouTube “channel” and profile contains other videos he posted regarding his experiences 
with bullying and is still operated by his sister.  See Jamey Rodemeyer, And This is Jamey’s HAUS (xgothemo99xx’s 
Channel), YOUTUBE (Last updated Oct., 2011), http://www.youtube.com/user/xgothemo99xx. 
2 Id.   
3 Carolyn Thompson, Jamey Rodemeyer’s Suicide Leads to Bullying Spotlight, Caution, THE HUFFINGTON POST, 
Sept., 28, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/29/jamey-rodemeyers-suicide-_n_987054.html.   
4 See Dan Savage, What is the It Gets Better Project, http://www.itgetsbetter.org/pages/about-it-gets-better-project/ 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2011).  The project, created by journalist Dan Savage and his partner Terry Miller, encourages 
individuals to personally reach out in support of LBGT youth by posting user-made YouTube Videos and was 
initially created in response to many young people taking their lives after being bullied by fellow students.  Id.   
5 Thompson, supra note 3.   
6 See Interview by Anderson Cooper with Alyssa, Tracy, and Timothy Rodemeyer, Sister, Mother, and Father of 
cyberbullied suicide victim Jamey Rodemeyer, in D.C. (Oct. 3, 2011) (available 
http://www.andersoncooper.com/2011/10/02/jamey-rodemeyer-family-speaks-out-about-bullying/).  Students 
responded with comments such as, “Jamey is stupid, fat and ugly.  He must die.  I wouldn’t care if you died.  :)  No 
one would – just do it.  It would make everyone way more happier.”  Id.   
7 Thompson, supra note 3.   
 2 
In September 2011, 14-year-old Jamey hung himself outside his parents’ home.8  Jamey’s 
14-year old sister discovered his body on the family swing set, “the same swing set that he was 
on since he was three years old.  That we built special for them,” Jamey’s mother later reported.9  
At a school dance the day of his wake, while Jamey’s friends huddled in groups consoling each 
other, a Lady Gaga song was played to honor the teen.
10
  Other students present, however, yelled 
they were glad Jamey was dead, simultaneously taunting his younger sister who was present.
11
   
While deaths like Jamey’s send shockwaves through communities, they are becoming 
horrifyingly more common.  In 2009, there was the story of Phoebe Prince, a young girl who 
transferred to South Hadley High School in Massachusetts from Ireland and as a freshman began 
dating a senior football player.
12
  In response, a group of girls began bullying her online, calling 
her “whore” and “Irish slut” through the social networking media of Facebook, Twitter, 
Craigslist and Formspring.
13
  School officials claimed they could not discipline any of the 
student bullies and the online harassment quickly gave way to face-to-face bullying.
14
  On 
January 14
th
, 2010, Phoebe hung herself in the stairwell of her home.
15
  
Typing any combination of the terms “cyberbullying” and “suicide” into Google reveals a 
familiar pattern: students bully a fellow peer via the Internet, school officials are unaware or 
                                                          
8 Id.   
9 Interview with the Rodeymeyer family, supra note 6.   
10 Thompson, supra note 3.   
11 Id.  Another interesting follow-up question which is increasingly becoming ripe for examination and being 
highlighted by the media, is whether or not it is within the school districts discretion to punish speech which occurs 
even after a victim has passed.  Arguably it is, as it has great chance of not only be materially disruptive to learning, 
but also could be construed as cyberbullying towards surviving family members, thereby creating “new” victims.    
12 Helen Kennedy, Phoebe Prince, South Hadley High School’s ‘New Girl,’ Driven to Suicide by Teenage Cyber 
Bullies, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 29, 2010, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-03-29/news/27060348_1_facebook-
town-hall-meetings-school-library.  Phoebe’s tormentors now face criminal charges for their actions and her case 
has prompted change to Massachusetts’s state laws.  Id.     
13 Id.  “Formspring” is a social-networking/media site that can be linked to Facebook accounts and is a self-
described way to “[f]ind out more about your friends by asking and responding to interesting questions.”  
FORMSPRING, http://www.formspring.me/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).   
14 Kennedy, supra note 12.   
15 Id.  After her death, Phoebe’s cyber-tormentors continued to post messages of hate on her Facebook wall.  Id.   
     
 3 
powerless, and the teen is eventually driven to suicide.  The search results are chilling, listing the 
names and stories of young, dead individuals, in a haunting cyber-eulogy.  Alexis Pilkington—
June 17, 1992-March 21, 2010.
16
  Like Phoebe and Jamey,
17
 bullies continued to post messages 
of hate on Alexis’s memorial page after the teen took her own life, with one anonymous 
comment reading, “She was obviously a stupid depressed [expletive] who deserved to kill 
herself. she [sic] got what she wanted. be [sic] happy for her death. rejoice [sic] in it.”18  
 Some of the following names may be vaguely familiar to you—maybe you heard them 
on a news clip or saw them in a recent paper.  Perhaps you are aware of them because they hit 
closer to home; maybe you knew someone who knew someone who knew them.  But regardless 
of how you know their names, the fact remains that each name belongs to a victim.  “Victim” is a 
negative term, albeit one with legal significance, yet it is one that conceals a person, an 
individual, beneath its harsh exterior.   In most cases this person—this human being, suffered a 
dramatic loss as a result of words that were directed at them through a screen, while the author 
cowardly hid in the refuge provided by the anonymous space.
19
  The number of “victims” is 
growing
20
 and will continue to grow if nothing is changed regarding the way the legal system—
                                                          
16 Edecio Martinez, Alexis Pilkington Brutally Cyber Bullied, even After her Suicide, CBS NEWS, Mar. 26, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20001181-504083.html.  The seventeen-year-old Alexis, who had 
already received a soccer scholarship to attend college, took her life in her Long Island home as a result of continued 
online harassment.  Id.  Pilkington’s parents initially claimed that their daughter had been depressed before the 
online bullying began, but later admitted that their daughter’s death was most likely the ultimate result of the 
ongoing harassment and threats.  Id.     
17 See Thompson supra note 3 and text accompanying; see also Kennedy supra note 12; see also supra note 11 and 
text accompanying.   
18 Martinez, supra note 17.  Finally, there was Ryan Halligan—who was only an 8th grader.  See Interview by PBS 
Frontline with John Halligan, victim’s father, found at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/kidsonline/interviews/halligan.html, (Oct. 19, 2007).  After being 
repeatedly harassed for his learning disabilities, frequently taunted as being homosexual, and made to believe that a 
girl from his class liked him, the Vermont boy took his own life in 2003.  Id.    
19 See Daniel infra note 89 at 623.   
20 See Amanda Lenhart, Marry Madden, Aaron Smith, Kristen Purcell, Kathryn Zickuhr, Lee Rainie, Teens, 
Kindness and Cruelty on Social Network Sites, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, FOSI, Nov. 9, 2011, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Teens-and-social-media/Summary.aspx.  The study reports that of the 
95% of social media-using teens who have witnessed cruel behavior on social networking sites, 66% have also 
reported they witnessed others joining the bullying and 21% admitted they joined the harassment as well.  Id.   
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both the construction afforded by judicial tests and the legislature currently on the books—
conceptualizes cyberbullying.
21
  The main problem in implementing this “change” however is 
that school districts frequently claim they are unable to punish students for off-campus internet 
speech, for fear of infringing on students’ First Amendment freedom of speech rights.22  Where 
the line should be drawn as to both remedial and preventative action by school districts depends 
on a redefining of the jurisprudence surrounding student Internet speech.  In sum, the discretion 
that the law affords school administrative procedures in dealing with discipline must ultimately 
be broadened.   
It is the off-campus Internet speech, activity, and bullying that remains a question and an 
area of heavy debate within the federal circuits.
23
  On June 13, 2011 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed opinions for both Layshock v. Hermitage School District and 
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, two factually similar cases involving cyberbullying and 
student-protected Internet speech.
 24
  In each of these much anticipated decisions, the Third 
Circuit held that the student-created offensive and derogatory profiles posted on MySpace from 
home computers,
 25
 were in fact protected by the First Amendment and the respective school 
                                                          
21 See Daniel, infra note 89 at 626–627.   
22 Id.  at 641. Daniel describes students as hiding behind the “First amendment shield,” where the law, in some 
aspects, is unable to reach them.  Id.  See e.g. Emmitt v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F.Supp.2d 1088, (W.D. Wash. 
2000); Beussink v. Woodland R–IV Sch. Dist., 30 F.Supp.2d 1175, (E.D. Mo. 1998); but see J.S. ex real v. 
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).   
23 See Daniel, infra note 52 at 626.  The author continues by noting that, “This First Amendment protection, 
originally invoked by students wishing to express their political views in Tinker, has unfortunately been 
overemphasized by federal district courts, whose opinions have in turn taught school personnel to be wary of 
disciplining potential bullies.”  Id.   
24 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, rehearing en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 
2011) (Jordan, K., concurring), aff’g 496 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007); J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 
(3rd Cir. 2011).   
25 See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 210 (the parody profile portrayed the principal as often getting drunk, doing steroids, 
smoking “big blunt[s],” and shoplifting from Kmart); see J.S., 650 F.3d at 918 (the female principal’s fake profile 
listed her interests as hitting on students, spending time with her unattractive child, and engaging in sexually deviant 
acts).   
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districts had erred in punishing the students for the off-campus speech.
26
  These holdings, which 
produced a split between the Third Circuit and cases already decided by the Second Circuit,
27
 are 
extremely problematic, providing none of the much needed guidance for students, administrators, 
or teachers with regard to the growing problem of cyberbullying.
28
  Before the Court’s June 13th 
holding, scholars and critics alike predicted that the decision would produce a definitive answer 
as to whether or not school districts could punish off-campus speech in general.
29
  Unfortunately, 
that the Third Circuit’s en banc ruling did not provide the much-needed guidance regarding 
student speech.
30
   
Such ambiguities remain and will continue to remain: on January 17, 2012, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari
31
 in both Layshock and J.S.’ cases, as well as another speech case, 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools involving a student suspended for abusing a classmate in a 
2005 off-campus-created website, which she then sent to fellow students urging them to 
comment.
32
  Given the broad range of federal court opinions on the subject, many, including the 
Pennsylvania ACLU attorneys involved in the case, had hoped the Supreme Court would decide 
the question relating to student Internet speech and cyberbullying sooner rather than later.
33
  
While the court gave no reason for its decision to resolve the conflict, Francisco Negron Jr., 
                                                          
26 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207; J.S., 650 F.3d at 920.   
27 See e.g. Doniger v. Niehoff, 2011 WL 1532289, (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming on appeal that the school district had 
not erred an there was no first amendment violation when a student was punished for off-campus online speech 
because she intended the blog eventually be viewed on campus).   
28 See Thomas Wheeler, Facebook Fatalities: Students, Social Networking and the First Amendment, 31 PACE L. 
REV. 182, 227 (2011).  Many commentators exhibited the impression that the courts rulings in Layshock and J.S. 
would end the uncertainty surrounding this problem.  Id.   
29 See id.   
30 See supra note 28.   
31 Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 11-502, 2012 WL 117558, *1 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012) (denying also 
the Layshock’s case and Kowalski’s 4th Circuit Case).   
32 652 F.3d 565, (4th Cir. 2011)(holding the school district did not violate the student’s free speech rights in 
suspending her nor did they violate her due process rights for issuing her suspension without a hearing, for posting 
the website).   
33 Maryclaire Dale, Online Student Speech Appeals Rejected by Supreme Court, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 17, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/17/court-rejects-appeals-in-_0_n_1210399.html.   
 6 
general counsel for the National School Board Association, urged the court to reconsider an off-
campus Internet speech case as soon as possible.
34
  Negron argued that because “technology 
blurs the lines between on-campus and off-campus speech, school districts need clear guidance 
to be able to effectively address extreme off-campus speech that interferes with a safe and 
orderly learning environment.”35 
II.  BACKGROUND:  THE SAME THING OVER AND OVER AGAIN  
A.  The Court’s Authority to Control and Ability to Protect 
 In determining whether students can be disciplined for off-campus conduct involving the 
use of the internet, courts first need to ascertain whether the social networking or cyber posts in 
question are, in fact, protected speech.  In doing so, the judiciary turns to a line of Supreme Court 
cases dealing with student speech in general.  As with speech that appears in more traditional 
educational contexts, an important factor the courts examine is whether Internet postings caused, 
or had a reasonable potential to cause, a substantial disruption in schools.
36
 
The 1969 Supreme Court holding in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District initiated the concept that a student has a right to express him or herself, while at 
school, so long as the speech does not interfere with the rights of others or the school’s 
disciplinary system.
37
  Only when a student’s conduct, whether in class or out, “materially 
disrupts” the classwork or involves a substantial disorder amounting to an invasion of the rights 
of others, is the speech not afforded any Constitutional protection.
38
  Tinker thus set the standard 
by which all courts begin an analysis in determining whether students can be disciplined for 
                                                          
34 See Bill Mears, High Court Rejects Appeals on Public Prayers, Student Speech, CNN U.S., Jan. 17, 2012, 
available at http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-17/us/us_scotus-appeals_1_appeals-court-student-speech-high-
court/2?_s=PM:US.   
35 Id.   
36 See Ronald D. Wenkart, Disruptive Student Speech and the First Amendment: How Disruptive Does it Have to 
Be?, 236 Educ. L. Rep. 551 (2008).  Wenkart provides a discussion of related issues.  
37 393 U.S. at 512–513.   
38 Id.   
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expressions either on or off campus.  Decided during the political turmoil of the 1960s and the 
Vietnam War, the Court invalidated the policy of a school board in Iowa prohibiting studetns 
from wearing black armbands in school to protest the war.
39
  Stating that “it could hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate,” the Tinker Court attempted to balance the rights of students 
against the previously recognized needs of educators to preserve discipline and order in 
schools
40.  The Supreme Court viewed the dispute as one “involve[ing] direct, primary First 
Amendment rights akin to ‘pure speech,’”41 rather than one “concern[ing] speech or action that 
intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.”42   
Thus, in order to prohibit the students from expressing particular points of view, the 
Court was convinced that the school officials must be able to show that their actions were 
motivated by something more than a bald desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular view.
43
  Where there is no finding and no showing that 
engaging in the forbidden conduct would “materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,” the prohibition cannot be 
sustained.
44
  Moreover, the Court proclaimed that disciplining students for expression violates 
the First Amendment unless school authorities can show either a material or substantial 
disruption occurred or that the potential for disruption was reasonably foreseeable.
45
   
About Seventeen years after Tinker, the Supreme Court examined the limits of student 
expression in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, a dispute in Washington state involving a 
                                                          
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 506. 
41 Id. at 508. 
42 Id.  
43 Id.   
44 Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).   
45 Id. 
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student who delivered a vulgar speech at a school assembly prior to student body elections.
46
  
While the speech did not contain any explicit profanity, it consisted of elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphors.
47
  The speech caused s substantial disruption, as some students in the 
audience cheered while others exhibited embarrassed behaviors.
48
  The student had ignored 
warnings from two educators not to deliver the speech and was suspended for three days for 
violating the school’s rule prohibiting obscene and profane language.49 
The Supreme Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in favor of the student, held that 
school officials are not prohibited from disciplining students for offensively lewd or indecent 
speech under the First Amendment.
50
  The Court continued by reasoning that school 
administrators were justified in disciplining the student for violating school rules because he 
delivered the speech after being advised against doing so.
51
  The Court distinguished the speech 
in Fraser from that in Tinker, where the students wearing of armbands were a passive, non-
disruptive expression of a political position, rather than an obscene speech incident to a student 
election, lacking a real political viewpoint and delivered to an unsuspecting captive audience.
52
  
Recognizing the duty of school personnel to control students habits and instill manners of 
civility, the Court insisted that “the determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or 
in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”53   
Additionally, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court addressed 
an issue concerning school officials’ control over school-sponsored publications.54  In Kuhlmier 
                                                          
46 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).   
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 685.   
51 Id. 
52 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684.   
53 Id. at 683.   
54 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev’d, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), remanded to 840 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1988).   
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a Missouri high school principal deleted two articles from a newspaper written and edited by 
students in a journalism class; on article was about teen pregnancy while the other dealt with a 
student’s parents’ divorce.55  The Eighth Circuit had held that the student newspaper was a 
public forum for First Amendment purposes and the school officials were not justified in 
censoring the articles.
56
   
The Court distinguished Tinker from Kuhlmeier by stating that the issue was not as much 
the right of students to speak as it was the duty of school personnel to not promote particular 
student speech.
57
  The Court recognized the authority of school administrators over school-
sponsored publications and student activities that could reasonably be perceived to bear a 
school’s “imprimatur.”58  Ultimately, the Court was satisfied that the First Amendment is not 
violated when school personnel exercise editorial control over the substance of school-sponsored 
publications if their actions are reasonably related to achieving valid educational objectives.
59
   
The Kuhlmeier  Court added that narrowly tailored, content-neutral regulations as to time, 
place, and manner of expression can be enforced but only if the governmental interest in 
question is significant and alternative channels of communication are open.
60
  The Court, in 
conceding that the public school a setting is a special context for First Amendment purposes, 
articulated that school personnel do not need to allow student speech that is inconsistent with the 
school’s basic educational mission when the speech is sponsored by the school or is part of its 
                                                          
55 Id. 
56 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 274.     
57 Id. at 271.   
58 Id. at 281.   
59 Id. at 260.  In its analysis the Court reviewed different categories that it felt delineated free speech.  The 
governmental power to regulate expression is most restricted on public property such as parks, streets, and 
sidewalks.  According to the Court, the government may prohibit speakers from traditional public forums only when 
it is necessary to serve compelling state interests and only when doing so by the least restrictive means possible.  Id. 
at 267.   
60 Id. at 267.   
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curriculum.
61
  Finally, the Court made a distinction between the assembly forum in Fraser and 
situations where school facilities and media are open for use by the general public, including 
student organizations.
62
 
Similarly, the Supreme Court definitively held in Morse v. Frederick that more traditional 
off-campus speech can be regulated when a student is off-campus on a public sidewalk, if the 
student is under the authority of the school at the time and is part of a school sanctioned event.
63
  
Morse arose when a student, during an Olympic torch relay through Alaska, waived a banner 
with the words “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” printed on it and was later suspended.64  When the 
student challenged his suspension, the federal court in Alaska granted the school board’s motion 
for summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in the student’s favor.65  The Supreme 
Court, on appeal, reversed the decision and rejected the student’s claim that he was not engaged 
in school speech, noting that the event was sufficiently associated with the school.
66
       
The Court first noted that “there is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when 
courts should apply school-speech precedents.”67  The Court also observed that students’ free 
speech rights must be viewed in light of the “special characteristics” existing in a school 
environment.
68
  Second, the Court ruled that Tinker is neither absolute nor the only basis on 
which student speech can be restricted.
69
  Noting that the Court’s own Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence understood the important, and perhaps even compelling, interest of educators to 
deter student drug use, the Court agreed that the principal acted properly in disciplining the 
                                                          
61 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266.   
62 Id. at 267.   
63 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
64 Id. at 408.   
65 Id. 
66 Id.  In finding that the principal’s interpretation that students could perceive the banner as promoting illegal drug 
use to be reasonable, the Court relied on Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier in conducting the two-part analysis.   
67 Id.  
68 Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.   
69 Id. at 405.   
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student who displayed the banner.
70
  The Court, however, did reject the school board’s argument 
that the principal could have banned the sign under Fraser’s “plainly offensive” standard, 
reasoning that doing so would grant school officials too much authority.
71
 
 This comment will mainly address the question of whether secondary school 
administration should be able to punish student’s vulgar speech or speech which is construed as 
cyberbullying through social media websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and their antecedents,
72
 
when it is done off-campus and potentially from a home computer or device that is not connected 
through a district server.  It is well settled that on-campus speech, (e.g. on school grounds or 
through a campus server) would fit into the traditional frame of the meaning of “within” the 
schoolhouse gate and would thus be punished like any other disruptive offense that occurs on 
school grounds.
73
  The Court, instead held that the principal acted out of the school’s legitimate 
concern of preventing the student from promoting illegal drug use.
74
 
  The main argument of this comment is that secondary school officials should be 
permitted to punish student Internet speech, even when it occurs off-campus.  School officials 
should be afforded this judgment without fearing a First Amendment action brought on behalf of 
the student,
75
 when (1) the speech in question is reasonably related to the school in some way
76
 
and (2) when there is a likelihood that a “material disruption” will occur or has already occurred, 
                                                          
70 Id. at 407, 409-10.  
71 Id. at 408.     
72 Many of the cases discussed at length/or which have dealt with this issue before are actually cases where the 
student speech in controversy or sought to be regulated were posted to MySpace, which had more of a rise in 
popularity in the late 1990s to early 2000s rather than the currently more popular Facebook or Twitter.  See Ben 
Bajin, Could what Happened to MySpace Happen to Facebook?, TIME, Jul. 15, 2011, 
http://techland.time.com/2011/07/15/could-what-happened-to-myspace-happen-to-facebook/ (the author argues that 
MySpace failed to innovate and serve its changing population and now is an outmoded form of social networking).  
73 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).  Accordingly, school districts have 
the authority to mete out punishment when the cyberbullying occurs physically “on-campus” or through on-campus 
servers.    
74 Id. at 410. 
75 Id.  at 627.   
76 The speech can be construed as being reasonably related if it is about another student, a teacher, the school itself 
or the administration.   
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under a good faith objective standard.
77
  Allowing school officials to decide whether or not a 
“material disruption” has occurred, further capitalizes on the discretion, judgment and experience 
of the school administration.  While it is true that the view advocated for in the past, detailing a 
more cognizable solution is to educate student’s on responsible technology and restrict speech 
less,
78
 the growing statistics representing cyberbullied youth clearly indicates a need for stronger 
regulation.
79
        
In defining a material disruption, the Court must look at a variety of factors mostly 
relating to the character of the disruption, but should not be forced to wait until actual harm 
affects other students, the school, or teachers. In assessing and reformatting how the speech 
surmounts the “schoolhouse gate” and can be punishable even when originating off-campus, the 
Tinker test must be re-formatted to be applicable in a changing technological era.
80
  Finally, if 
the action then progresses, the Court should balance the student’s free speech interests with the 
school district’s interests in providing an effective learning environment, but with a presumption 
weighing in favor of the school district.   
B.  Punishing Cyberbullying and the Need for a New Formulation of the Tinker Test  
Once simply just a compound term created to give a name to a new form of Internet 
abuse, cyberbullying has reached an immense status in the United States.  It is no longer a secret 
that the Internet allows students to both surreptitiously voice and widely disseminate their 
opinions, tastes, and frustrations to and about their peers.  It is also increasingly apparent how the 
anonymous nature of the Internet can also provide a dangerous veil for students to hide behind as 
a means to bully not only each other, but also other members of their secondary school 
                                                          
77 See infra Part III.A.2  
78  See Papandrea, infra note 196.   
79  See infra note 164.   
80 See Daniel, infra note 89 at 625.  See also Student Comment, UPDATES TO MYSPACE AND THE SOCIAL 
NETWORKING WORLD, 16 B.U. J. SCI. AND TECH. 14, 18 (2010).   
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community.
81
  Similarly, when online abuse is directed toward teachers, it injures students’ 
ability to learn by hurting teacher credibility and effectiveness in the classroom.
82
  When 
students bully and abuse each other, even in a cyber context, this behavior has the ability to 
distract from learning altogether and becomes a detrimental stumbling block in the way of 
furthering our nation’s educational system.83   
This comment
84
 promotes endowing schools with the authority to punish vulgar Internet 
speech when done off-campus when it meets certain threshold tests, which must be redesigned 
and adapted for the present era.
85
  Part II will give an over-view of the jurisprudence regarding 
the right of a secondary school district to discipline student speech and the interaction with the 
student’s first Amendment rights.  Section III presents a proposed updated analysis86 by first 
setting main recommended “guidelines” outlining when school districts should be allowed to 
                                                          
81 See supra note 20.   
82 See Gail Masuchika Boldt, Paula M. Salvio, & Peter M. Taubman, Classroom Life in the Age of Accountability, 
Mar. 2009, Available at: http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED505851.pdf.  The authors describe the harm that comes 
from allowing students to post negatively about students, teachers, the school, or the school community as an injury 
to prestige and community values and thus teaching often does not receive the credibility as a profession in America 
as it does in other countries.  Id.    
83 See Michael Ollove, Bullying and Teen Suicide: How do we Adjust School Climate?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Apr. 28, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2010/0428/Bullying-and-teen-suicide-How-do-
we-adjust-school-climate.  
84 It should be noted that many of the cases highlighted in this comment seem more about addressing the harm that 
occurs when a student has “bullied” a teacher or administrator via the Internet.  While this seems to summarize an 
aspect of many of the cases that make their way to trial, it is just as promising to assess student speech in the context 
of peer bullying because it seems to be the “subset” of most concern.  Many times, victims of student-on-student 
cyberbullying fail to bring or cannot bring suit against their tormentors, thus explaining the lack of documented case 
examples in some instances.  Often, when a student commits suicide as the result of cyberbullying, the school 
district will have insisted that they could not mete out any punishment prior to the event, such as the case with 
Phoebe Prince’s tormentors and the legal system is only resorted to for purposes of criminal charges or a wrongful 
death suit.  See Kennedy, supra note 12.   
85 See supra Section A.   
86 Because of the general fear of “prevalence” of works written on the topic of cyberbullying and regulation I intend 
to define the contours of my discussion with precision.  Frequently, the articles I came across were written at a much 
earlier date/before the latest holding on the most recent cases were handed down (on Layshock and J.S.) and thus 
their discussions/recommendations are now moot/no longer applicable.  My note will only apply to the speech of 
secondary school students (public/or the public school context in general) and will not apply to college students, 
dorm activity, or the protection teachers have when they are the party initiating the online speech (teachers will 
obviously be discussed as victims of cyberbullying as that is what many of the cases turn on).   
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punish this speech.  It begins with a proposed modification of the Supreme Court “Tinker Test” 87 
for Internet speech cases.  Section III further discusses how the test in its current form and the 
proposed re-formulation, affect administrative discretion over students’ education.88  Section IV 
will consider how the proposed modification to certain “definitional deficiencies” existing in the 
Tinker test could also be implicated or rectified through legislation.  Section V provides a 
discussion of how the Court should rule to redefine the test, should they choose to certify a case.  
Finally, Section VI will consider how the concept of the need for a new test interacts with the 
recent “bullying” legislation that is being proposed in various forms.  It is lastly of great 
importance to consider the policy implications surrounding entities which argue for a crackdown 
with laws that adopt a “zero tolerance” approach and to consider the federal legislation has been 
proposed in various capacities.   
The reformulation of the Tinker test will ultimately prove useful because the current 
iteration is overly complex
89
 and does not provide specific definitions for certain key terms in the 
balancing test (i.e. material disruption, the schoolhouse gate begins and ends).  This causes 
confusion for both courts in deciding the cases and school administrators in formulating their 
policies.  In examining the reformulation of a student-speech monitoring test, the ultimate goal is 
to create a rule or law which effectively allows school districts and school officials to punish 
cyberbullying, while keeping students’ first amendment rights in tact.  At its core, the purpose of 
                                                          
87 Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, at 507 (holding that a school cannot punish student speech unless a substantial and material 
disruption occurred).  
88 This question, although asked before, comes now again at a very critical time, having even more relevance in the 
changing school regulatory climate of the present.  The discretion and the question of allowing/disallowing 
punishment plays into an ongoing battle of what parts of education on school-wide/district level should be left to 
what level of discretion (and whose discretion).  
89 See Philip Daniel, Bullying and Cyberbullying in Schools: An Analysis of Student Free Expression, Zero 
Tolerance Policies, and State Anti-Harassment Legislation, 268 Ed. Law Rep. 619, 626 (2011) (providing an 
overview of cyberbullying attacks in the United States and recent updates in the law, however the piece does not 
include the Third Circuits most recent ruling on Layshock and J.S.).  Daniel describes the decisions from the U.S. 
courts as having “constructed a jurisprudence for student free speech rights  in the schoolhouse context that can be 
described as complex, somewhat dissociative, and perhaps contradictory.”  Id.   
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any anti-bullying rule is the creation of an intimidation-free (and arguably more effective) 
learning environment.  The formulation of the test as detailed in this comment is ultimately 
preferable, because it provides the necessary guidance lacking in the current iteration, with 
regard to the balancing of interests, materiality of the disruption, and the crucial question of the 
boundaries of the schoolhouse gate, as applied in a modern context.
90
   
C.  What Exactly Constitutes Cyberbullying?: Definitions and Overview  
Bullying is often defined as aggression that is repeatedly targeted toward an individual 
who has the inability to easily defend himself, with intentionality requiring some element of 
malice.
91
  Traditionally, the concept of bullying (in general) was student on student and 
punishable when done in an off-campus context.
92
  But the evolution of bullying as a power 
mechanism now reaches past the student-on-student context to include students bullying 
teachers, their administration, and initiating large scale school-wide threats.
93
  Thus, in order to 
serve the purposes of rules, which can touch off-campus Internet speech thereby surmounting a 
First Amendment challenge by a student, one must analyze the “means” of bullying and the 
“place” of bullying to a much greater extent.  One constant in the variety of existing 
cyberbullying definitions, is that the term still remains increasingly difficult to define.
94
   
The most comprehensive definition, to date, comes from a Canadian awareness website, 
articulating cyberbullying as “the use of information and communication technologies to support 
deliberate, repeated, and hostile behavior by an individual or group that is intended to harm 
                                                          
90 See infra Part III.A.4 
91 DAN OLWEUS, BULLYING AT SCHOOL: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE CAN DO 8 (Judy Dunn, 1993).  Olweus 
goes on to explain that aggression is comprised of a single act, while bullying has the characteristic of repetition 
inherent in its definition.  Id.     
92 Id.   
93 See supra Section A.   
94 Julian J. Dooley, Jacek Pyzalski, & Donna Cross, Cyberbullying Versus Face-to-Face Bullying: a Theoretical and 
Conceptual Review, 217 J. OF PSYCHOL., 182, 184 (2009).   
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others.”95  Because of the breadth of what the internet now contains, cyberbullying can currently 
include the degrading speech which occurs through social networking spaces (Facebook, 
MySpace, Twitter), emails, text messages, multi-media messages, instant messaging (AIM, 
Google Chat, Facebook chat), chat rooms and forum-board postings, and online phone services 
(such as Skype and video chat functions).
96
  The setting for the bullying is therefore key, 
however imprecise the definition; cyberbullying takes place in cyberspace, a “decentralized, 
global medium of communication which links people, institutions, corporations and governments 
around the world.”97 
In both Layshock v. Hermitage School District and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 
the Third Circuit ruled that derogatory profiles the respective students created about their 
principals and subsequently posted on MySpace
98
 were protected by the First Amendment, 
occurring off-campus and thus could not be punished by the school district.
99
  One of the issues 
faced by the court in Layshock was the fact that the student, Justin Layshock had used a school 
resource by lifting a photo of his principal off the school website and then coupled it with 
content from a survey, with all the “answers…based on the theme of ‘big’ because [the principal 
he was insulting] is apparently a large man.”100  The court however, found that Justin’s “entry” 
                                                          
95 Bill Belsey, THE PARTNERSHIP FOR BULLYING PREVENTION, http://www.cyberbullying.ca or 
http://www.cyberbullying.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).   
96 See Daniel, supra note 89 at 623.  The author goes on to describe how it is the “medium of this bullying [as] what 
gives cyberbullying its unique name.” Id.   
97 DAVID SPERRY AND PHILIP T.K. DANIEL, ET. AL., EDUCATION LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A COMPENDIUM 
610 (Christopher–Gordon Pub., 1998) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
98 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, rehearing en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (Jordan, K., concurring), aff’g 496 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).  
99 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 205; J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, (3rd Cir. 2011).  The court in Layshock 
specifically asked: can the court punish expressive conduct, which originates outside the schoolhouse, does not 
destroy the school environment and is not related to a school-sponsored event.  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 243.   
100 Id. at 210.   
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onto the website was not enough to be considered within the schoolhouse gates for the purposes 
of the Tinker analysis.
101
 
  The Second Circuit, faced with different facts, however, has (most recently in 2008) 
allowed a school to punish vulgar Internet speech by a student, even if the speech occurred 
online/off campus.
102
  In Doninger, a high school student council member posted a comment on 
her blog from a home computer, complaining about a school event, which was cancelled “due to 
the douche bags in central office,” and encouraging her peers to do the same.103  The school 
district received various phone calls, some from upset students who had followed the blogs 
directives.
104
  As a result, the student council member who had written the blog was prohibited 
from running for student council in the future.
105
  In her First Amendment challenge, the Second 
Circuit found that the school district had the authority to punish the student and even though the 
post was created off-campus, because the post, “foreseeably create[d] the risk of substantial 
disruption within the school environment.”106  The result is seemingly incongruous.  The Second 
Circuit has allowed school officials to punish off-campus student speech and thus afforded it no 
protection, even when only based on hypothetical results.  The Third Circuit, in contrast, has 
refused to punish speech even where, arguably, harm has already occurred.
107
   
Both tests derived their essential reasoning by using the original, and oft-challenged, test 
as set down in the Supreme Court in Tinker.  As discussed above, while this comment advocates 
generally for the reasoning set forth by the 2nd Circuit court in Doninger, it also attempts to 
                                                          
101 Id. at 232. 
102 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008).   
103 Id. at 45.   
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 50.   
106 Id.  The court went on to affirm that it was, in fact, reasonably foreseeable that “administrators and teachers 
would further be diverted from their core educational responsibilities by the need to dissipate misguided anger or 
confusion over [the event’s] purported cancellation.”  Id. at 51-2.   
107 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, rehearing en banc, 650 F.3d 205, 
207 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, K., concurring), aff’g 496 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007); see J.S., 650 F.3d at 920.   
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advance a more workable, new “test” which focuses on the context and online forum of the 
students’ speech as well as where the speech is directed, driving the reasoning away from any 
“tests” that may have been suggested before.  This comment also delineates how and when 
certain student speech is no longer considered “protected” and how the courts can effectively 
surmount the First Amendment challenges that will inevitably arise.  
 Scholars, student authors, and theorists alike frequently have alleged that a new approach 
is needed to the underlying problem either through the courts, legislature, or school districts 
themselves.
108
  But few of these theorists have actually even attempted to articulate what they 
feel the new test, law, or school policy should be.  One exception to this generality is the view 
posited by Thomas Wheeler, the author of an article which appeared in the 2011 winter 
publication of the Pace University’s Law Review, which advocated for a “magic bullet theory” 
to resolve the cyberbullying punishment issue.
109
  Wheeler’s test, however, is ultimately 
unhelpful, for a variety of reasons.  First, Wheeler argues within his article that the moment of 
creation of the student speech is irrelevant, and the focus of any new test should be the access, 
which can be achieved at school.
110
  While it may be correct that the speech should be punished 
if it is accessed at school, one cannot simply disregard the moment of creation.  Creation is 
essential and relevant, considering the speech’s eventual on-campus dissemination, in light of the 
fact that may school’s today retain sophisticated blocking applications upon their servers.    
The heading of this section refers to this minor phenomenon as “the same thing over and 
over again,” because it is interesting and perhaps even indicative of the need for the solution in 
                                                          
108 See Thomas Wheeler, Facebook Fatalities: Students, Social Networking and the First Amendment, 31 PACE L. 
REV. 182, 227 (2011); See also Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers and 
Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue the Supreme Court must now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 
252 (2009).   
109 Wheeler, supra note 28, at 184.  Wheeler argues that across the spectrum of cases, Tinker can be properly applied 
in certain circumstances.  Id.     
110 Id. at 215.   
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this realm of the law.
111
  It seems, at least from a distance, that many scholars are willing to 
openly discuss the fact that the United States educational system has a problem in this area -- and 
yet no one is willing to propose a more definite solution.  Could it perhaps be because theorists 
and lawmakers alike are afraid to disrupt the delicate balance and supposedly “time-tested” 
interworking of the Tinker test?  Or perhaps the fear can be explained through the notion that 
reducing the protection surrounding student Internet speech as it relates to school-matters has the 
potential to lead to a slippery slope, where censorship abounds and online privacy for students, 
teachers and school administrators alike fails to exist.  By monitoring Internet activity, are we 
not reducing cyberbullying, but actually hindering the creativity and minds of our youth?  While 
conceivable, each of these concerns can be addressed and the distress conjured can be allayed 
through a most careful drafting of a new rule, accompanied by an instructional means of 
implication.  Yet the hesitance and the Tinker test remains, leading this author to bluntly ask, 
what is our legal system afraid of?   
D. From Tinker Forward: A Progression and Overview of Cases and Terms 
   While a progressive overview of the body of case law surrounding the First Amendment 
jurisprudence regarding protected student speech has already been engaged in above, a review of 
the terminology of cyberbullying, forming the background and support for the proposed 
solutions to the problem of off-campus cyberbullying is also instructive.  As was previously 
mentioned, the court in Tinker first promoted the “material and substantial” disruption test, with 
regard to students wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.
112
  But it is 
indeed highly possible that the Supreme Court Justices, who decided Tinker in 1969, could have 
                                                          
111 The pieces frequently begin by citing a recent incident, followed by (in some cases) a discussion of the 
progression of the cases dealing with the student speech and the progeny of Tinker and finishing with a generalized 
recommendation that the way the law and society thinks about/deals with cyberbullying needs to change. 
112 Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, at 507. 
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never contemplated the growth and change, altering the landscape of what is defined as student 
speech.  Subsequently, the Supreme Court determined that the schools were truly instruments of 
the state and thus may determine that the essential lessons of “civil, mature conduct cannot be 
conveyed in a school that tolerates…offensive speech and conduct.”113  Later, the Third Circuit, 
interpreting the holding in Bethel, determined that there is no First Amendment protection for 
lewd, vulgar, indecent and plainly offensive speech in school.
114
  
E.  Bullying vs. Harassment: The Subtle Differences 
 Janis Wolak’s famous 2007 study suggested that it is much more accurate to consider 
“repeated acts of online aggression as online harassment.”115  Wolak and her research team 
initially argued that online harassment was far easier to terminate than face to face bullying, as a 
website is much easier to take down, but later added that there are instances where tracking the 
bully to a website and then removing the harassment could be extremely difficult.
116
  In general, 
while it might be somewhat early to identify “trends” in this area (as to the character of 
cyberbullying as an overarching principal), it is at least reasonable and worth noting that 
cyberbullying differs greatly from normal face to face bullying in its ability to reach large 
numbers of people.  In one notable psychology study, the comparison between cyberbullying and 
face-to-face bullying was broken down into the categories of the imbalance of power and the 
repetition of the bullying done over time.
117
  In this case, “scope” means that in the past, bullying 
was done face to face and the maximum audience were those who were immediately present or 
                                                          
113 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).  The court in Fraser distinguished a student’s 
high school nomination speech at a school assembly, which included a graphic sexual metaphor as punishable from 
the black protest armbands in Tinker.  Id.  It is possible that this disparity results from the ‘who’ who is promoting 
the speech, an adult in one case and a child in the other.   
114 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001).   
115 Janis Wolak, J.K. Mitchell, & D. Finkelhor, Does Online Harassment Constitute Bullying?: An Exploration of 
Online Harassment by Known Peers and Online-Only Contacts, J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH, S51, S55 (2007). 
116 Id. at S57.     
117Julian J. Dooley, Jacek Pyzalski, & Donna Cross, Cyberbullying Versus Face-to-Face Bullying: a Theoretical and 
Conceptual Review, 217 J. OF PSYCHOL., 182, 184 (2009).   
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who then would be drawn to the crowd or spread rumors.  Although it may seem self-obvious, it 
is clear and must be mentioned how cyberbullying and bullying which takes place through an 
internet forum has a much broader scope,
118
 can reach more audiences, and can alter a student or 
teacher’s public image within mere moments of its upload.  The spreading of the speech then 
becomes an even more crucial issue.  When students not only “tag,” post, share links, text, or 
even in this case as well, share the medium through word of mouth—rapidity gives way to an 
immediacy of impact.   
F.  The “Point” of School Discipline 
While performing an overview of the law in this domain, it is important to note the extent 
of a school’s ability to discipline its students’ off-campus speech/activity as given a grant of 
authority to punish by state law.  Further, what is the point of school districts being able to 
punish off-campus Internet speech when/if it falls within the proper domain of the law?  At its 
core, the purpose of disciplining students for cyberbullying within schools is to promote good 
citizenship and help foster/create a learning environment with the ability to reach an optimal use 
of school resources.  By reducing threats and hindrances in the form of distractions, educators 
can promote school communities that are allowing the maximum number of students to learn and 
grow into the type of “future” leaders and contributors we desire as a population.   
III.  COLLISION, DE-INDIVIDUALIZATION, DISCRETION AND BALANCING: 
WALKING THE TIGHTROPE TO A NEW TEST 
 
The main overarching problem that seems to occur when coping with the cases and legal 
incidents surrounding cyberbullying, is how the rules, laws, and judicial standards as set by the 
                                                          
118 Id.  The authors argue that it may be the technology and the “specific features of the content initially published—
not the initial perpetrator’s intentions and behavior,” which define the degree of severity of the cyber-bullying.  Id.   
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federal circuits, either align or collide with a student’s first amendment rights.119  This comment 
outlines a variety of potential solutions; however they can each be summarized briefly as part of 
an overview in context of the trajectory of the overall argument.   
First, there is the position that the Court need not scrap the Tinker test entirely, but update 
the formula in its next major hearing concerning student Internet speech.  This alteration of the 
test should conform to the growth, which has occurred via technology, changing the nature of the 
speech in general.
120
  In this reformulation, the balancing test of interests (school district and 
student’s) must be updated and certain definitions, which compose the test, must be redefined in 
light of the present advances in technology.   
In contrast to this judicial remedy, there is a second possible solution, involving school 
districts across the nation taking the initiative to train and educate their students on internet 
speech and behavior, within the interaction of an anti-bullying program and a fair use policy.
121
  
Proponents of this alternative see such school-district initiatives as pre-emptive strikes on 
cyberbullying or student speech.  While school administration authored policies are perhaps a 
step in the right direction, they also could become problematic by limiting student-speech in such 
a way that students refuse to “sign” the codes of conduct they are embodied in, further giving 
parents the impetus to sue.  A third solution, which may encompass pieces of the pre-emptive 
attack, is the use of cyberbullying legislation to solve the problem.  A number of states have 
adopted these types of laws, which may operate on a district level; however there is yet to be a 
federal statute that deals directly with the specific regulation and punishment of cyberbullying.   
As a starting proposition, one of the most convincing arguments comes out of Judge Kent 
Jordan’s concurrence in Layshock, where the Third Circuit Judge opines, “to the extent it appears 
                                                          
119 See Daniel, supra note 89 at 626.   
120 See id.   
121 See Interview with Bowen and Wehr, supra and accompanying text.   
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we have undercut the reasoned discretion of administrators to exercise control over the school 
environment, we will not have served will those affected by the quality of public education, 
which is to say everyone.”122  Jordan goes on to further explain that, although the Third Circuit 
has not said that Tinker is inapplicable to off-campus speech simply because it is done off-
campus, he has a fear that the court’s decision would send a message, that “anything goes” in 
terms of non-punishable internet student speech.
123
  Proponents of wide discretion for school 
districts view this specific piece of Jordan’s concurrence as his expression of (albeit tentative) 
support for school administrative efforts to maintain order.  Jordan’s support only extends though 
when the student speech gets to the point where it becomes, “a potent tool for distraction and 
fomenting disruption,” as it arguably did in the case of Layshock.124   
In agreement with Judge Jordan’s rationale, it is arguable that the Tinker test should 
continue to be used as a means to gain order arising out of a balance in schools with respect to 
student free speech.
125
  While it is not plausible that an approach should be taken which allows 
excessive rigidity and school district discretion, effectively reducing each student to just 
“Another Brick in the Wall,”126 courts must be mindful of the challenges that school officials 
face.  Teachers and administrators alike bear the weight of such tasks as promoting a safe 
learning environment, being mindful of student welfare, and creating a culture, which is most 
conducive to noticeable gains.   
A.  Rebooting Tinker for the Technological Era 
                                                          
122 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, rehearing en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (Jordan, K., concurring), aff’g 496 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).   
123 Id. at 251–252.   
124 Id. at 252.   
125 Id.  
126 See PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall, on THE WALL (Columbia Records 1979).   
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 The Tinker test, which implies a weighing approach,
127
 exudes timelessness in some 
contexts, but truly needs to be re-evaluated for the technological times.  This is not to say that the 
Supreme Court should endeavor (if and when it decides this issue before the legislation tackles it 
first) to completely over-rule the Tinker test.  Rather, it should be “updated” and re-evaluated in 
the next case the Court chooses to hear, with the ultimate goal being an adaptation to the test’s 
parameters in the context of cyberbullying occurring off-campus.  Of course there will be 
dissident voices to this approach, but the technological world is rarely reinvented without such 
outcries of dissent.
128
 
1.  Part I:  Update to the Balancing Test 
First, the “balancing” element of the test should be ultimately kept, but should 
specifically include new factors and be restructured as to how the test functions in application.  
In matters of application, it is instructive to note how the field of employment law applies its 
own First Amendment tests to the similarly situated matters of employee-protected speech within 
the workplace.  While employment law may seem an unlikely candidate from which to “borrow” 
instructive legal applications, casebook author and expert on private ordering within employment 
                                                          
127 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969).  The opinion specifically describes how 
“[students] may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of 
a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of 
expression of their views.”  Id.   
128 For example, in every instance that Facebook changes its interface/design, there are immediate online outbursts 
of negative reactions.  While this specific social networking sites is a free form of expression that no one is forced to 
use, the analogy illustrates a point.  In the past, federal courts relied on the security and expectations of the Tinker 
test in deciding bullying litigation on the secondary school level.  But this is not to say that if the test were slightly 
altered to reflect the evolving world that it would render it useless and “users” i.e.: the courts, schools, and the 
public would abandon it altogether in favor of something else.  Generation Y users have had Facebook since 2005 or 
earlier, just like the courts have had Tinker since 1969.  When Facebook changes, we grumble, post our outrage and 
clumsily learn the new applications, but within months hardly notice the adjustments to this constant presence in our 
lives.  While this analogy may be slightly mismatched to the application of judicial test, the point the author is trying 
to make is that while there may be a period of adjustment using “Tinker 2.0,” the legal community will adjust and 
find no need to completely abandon something just because the interface looks a little different. 
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Timothy Glynn suggests that similarities exist between the to fields regarding issues of 
cyberbullying.
129
   
With that in mind, some analogous employment law formulas have been borrowed in the 
formation of the proposed test.  The balancing test will retain the essential concept of weighing 
the school’s interests with the student’s first amendment rights/interests, however, it is apparent 
that the factors which must be considered in the weighing process must be redefined and in some 
cases added.  On the student side, many of the questions (such as factors 1 and 2), really first ask 
if the student’s speech was actually bullying (regardless if it was toward a school personnel or a 
student) or of a vulgar nature.
130
  The factors will not line-up evenly within the test, as the 
student’s interests have more categories to consider.  Accordingly, more weight should be given 
to each of the school district factors as a general proposition.  The purpose of such weighting, is 
to give the school district the presumption of discretion, unless the student makes a substantial 
showing and can prove that many of the factors weigh in his/her favor.
131
  
2.  The School’s Multi-Factorial Interests  
At the outset, it is helpful to consider that the individual schools or the school districts 
have several interests that must be considered and served, thus creating a multi-factorial aspect 
of the test. With regards to factor one, the original starting point of Tinker, should be kept, with 
the fact finder asking “Does the speech cause a substantial, material disruption?”  A reoccurring 
                                                          
129 Timothy P. Glynn, Professor of Law, Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of Law, Employment Law Class Lecture on 
Workplace Harassment and Employee Causes of Action (Sept. 27, 2011).  In his lecture, Glynn further noted that 
while workplace bullying has not evolved in its protectionist measures with regard to the workplace, considerable 
growth had been seen in the adoption of cyberbullying measures in the realm of education, which certain individual 
workplaces have chosen to adapt internally.  Id.   
130 Although this is a question which seems like a threshold issue, it is the manner and exacting way in which the 
question is asked which will further this inquiry.   
131 Each factor does not necessarily need to be met, and that fact that one is not, is not dispositive of the court still 
being able to find either a situation where punishment is allowed or in which the First Amendment is protective.  It 
is for the discretion of the court to decide within the new framework as established.  It should also be noted that 
many of the factors overlap and interact, so thus, as of now I see no specific reason to mandate that there must be a 
specific order in which the court examines them.  This may of course, change as my inquiry and research further 
progresses.   
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issue between the federal courts as to what constitutes a “substantial disruption” of the school 
environment,
132
 which factors into the struggle of achieving an appropriate and effective 
balancing test.  First, it is imperative that (as factor 3 will also show) a school can and should be 
able to take action pre-emptively, even before a substantial disruption occurs.  School 
administers frequently “bear the brunt of setting and enforcing their own cyberbullying rules, a 
daunting challenge given the current breadth and depth of student free speech rights.”133  One 
main goal of the reformulation should make it clear that this burden is slightly alleviated.  If the 
school officials, in their best judgment, feel that a disruption could be imminent if the Internet 
student speech becomes widely disseminated amongst the student population, they should have 
the discretion to discipline the student.  Even if it has yet to cross the bounds of the schoolhouse 
gate, school officials should be permitted to act.   
When examining the material disruption itself, one must first consider what the “nexus” 
is between the speech and the school.  Is it such that a reasonable person can easily identify a 
strong and pervasive connection between the two, so that the school (in general/many facets) 
could be seen as having been impacted by the speech?
134
  In the past, courts have found that 
simply because students discuss the speech in class or in school, the underlying Internet content 
                                                          
132 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, rehearing en banc, 650 F.3d 205, 
212–213, (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, K., concurring), aff’g 496 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).  After word broke out 
about the profile, the school’s technology department attempted to disable the profile unsuccessfully, whereupon 
certain computer classes then had to be cancelled, computer labs shut-down, and schedules rearranged for several 
days.  Id.  It is arguable that this amount of reactionary work by a school district would, in fact, constitute a 
substantial disruption.  The Hermitage School district, however, conceded that Layshock’s actions did not cause a 
disruption and the court refused to allow the school district to punish speech that was made from the creator’s 
grandmother’s home computer, a place where he was ultimately protected by the First Amendment.  Id.  Had the 
school district not made this concession, the outcome may have been drastically different.   
133 Daniel supra note 89 at 627.  
134 This also will play into “Factor 1” of the student side of the balancing test.  In understanding the student’s 
purpose of the speech, the court or lawmaker will need to explore the connection between the speech and the school, 
with an eye to intended and actual impact and how closely connected the speech may be to the reality of the school-
world.  For instance, if a student is speaking out about something which is actually occurring and is harming 
students (perhaps such as a dangerous physical condition in a building), the nexus is clear but the speech was not 
intended to bully, but rather inform and correct.   
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does not constitute a material disruption.
135
  Similarly, the disruption must rise beyond merely 
upsetting the staff due to the content of the speech to be considered “material”.136  While a 
student’s mobile tweet mocking the governor on a school field trip to the capital may be 
embarrassing to the school district,
137
 it is far less disrupting then invidious comments about 
race, gender, religion or even personal threats on a teacher.  This again presents a difficult 
stumbling block, which must be surmounted in the proposal of a new test.  If it can be proven 
that the cyberbullying speech is upsetting a student or a teacher to the point that the learning 
environment is materially impacted, (e.g. the student or teacher is unable to function), would that 
justify a legal finding of a material disruption?
138
  Most likely the answer would be yes, however 
this query seems to require more of an examination into the reasonableness of the situation on a 
case-by-case basis.    
A third question to be asked: Does the speech create a “reasonable apprehension” (in the 
best judgment of the school officials, using their experience in education and in their capacity as 
the initial authorities who have professional knowledge with which best to judge the event of the 
student speech) that a disruption will occur in the learning environment as a result of the 
speech?
139
  More simply put, this standard gives the court leave to assess whether or not the 
school administration had a good faith, objective belief that the speech would disrupt the school 
environment.  This factor has, in the past, been defined as if the student Internet speech could 
                                                          
135 J.C. ex. Rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills School Dist., 711 F.Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cali. 2010).   
136 See Beussink v. Woodland, 30 F.Supp.1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).   
137 Mara Rose Williams, Teen’s Joking Tweet on Topeka Trip Creates a Capital Fracas, THE KANSAS CITY STAR, 
Nov. 23, 2011, http://www.kansascity.com/2011/11/23/3283680/students-joke-creates.html.  After listening to a 
speech by Governor Sam Brownback, high school senior Emma Sullivan tweeted, “Just made mean comments at 
[sic] gov. brownback and told him he sucked, in person #heblowsalot”  Id.   
138 The other side of this view is that interferences, which supposedly impact the other rights of students, such as the 
right to a free learning environment, are frequently given too much weight in situations such as this.  See CAMBRON-
MCCABE, N., MCCARTHY, M., & THOMAS, S., LEGAL RIGHTS OF TEACHERS AND STUDENTS 290 (Allyn & Bacon, 2nd 
ed. 2009).   
139 See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001).  The Saxe court held that if school 
officials can point to a well-founded expectation of disruption, a restriction of the speech may pass.  Id.   
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potentially make its way to the school campus in a “foreseeable” manner.  Again, though, there 
is a problem of what constitutes “foreseeable” as no court has ever strictly defined the term, only 
given examples.   
The Western District of Pennsylvania and the Central District of California have each 
found that communicating existence or knowledge of the cyberbullying to another student by the 
creator off campus, makes it foreseeable that the speech may make its way to the schoolyard and 
cause a substantial disruption.
140
  While common sense notion behind this test for assessing the 
chance that the speech may cross the “schoolhouse” gate is reasonable, the term “foreseeability” 
should defined in more definite terms.  The threshold question then becomes: Do the school 
administrators or officials dealing with the speech have a well-founded belief that it will cause a 
disruption?  This prediction or belief may be influenced by past-experiences school 
administrators have seen or have learned through district and state specific professional trainings 
that have urged them to target these kinds of behaviors as bullying.  In order for the belief to be 
“reasonable” the likelihood of a disruption needs to pass a certain threshold: it needs to be not 
just possible, but probable that a disruption will occur.    
The court in J.S. seemed to promote the idea that student speech could be “so 
outrageous” that it was essentially easy to detect that it lacked sincerity.141  This creates a great 
matter of perplexity, as it becomes increasingly difficult to determine how one would “know” if 
the student was serious or not.   For example, the school district might perceive the speech as an 
empty threat, a student simply venting his frustrations, or as a vehicle of humor.  When Emma 
Sullivan made the aforementioned tweet about her state’s governor, she claims the message “was 
                                                          
140 See Killian v. Franklin Regional School, 136 F.Supp.2d 446, (W.D. Penn. 2001); see also J.C. ex. Rel. R.C. v. 
Beverly Hills School Dist., 711 F.Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cali. 2010).   
141 J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 923 (3rd Cir. 2011).   
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harmless…[and that it was] not like [she] was really fired up about anything [Governor 
Brownback] said.
142
  Accordingly, “believability” within the test should perhaps be tied to the 
credibility of the threat: it does not matter if the threatening behavior is outrageous as long as it 
can perhaps be grounded in some fact or is perhaps an action that a student might be reasonably 
capable of committing.  It is most likely best however, that the school administration err on the 
side of caution, as it is apparent from past tragedies
143
, that students are frequently capable of 
even the most destructive events.
144
   
Finally, as part of the fourth element, the fact finder must ask: does the speech cause an 
invasion of the rights of others?  In summation, the appropriate test is that which was originally 
laid down in Tinker, plus a critical analysis of the facts surrounding the speech, might reasonably 
lead a school district to foresee material interference with the learning environment.
145
 
3.  Contrasting the Students’ Interests  
Before even examining the factors to be weighed in the students’ favors, One might ask: 
are there other/better formulations of first amendment rights/incorporative tests out there that can 
be used to model what should actually be considered in this case?  First, one must consider the 
nature and character of the speech, meaning the actual topic the speech concerns.  The speech 
should be particularly flagged as potential cyberbullying if it is critical or disparaging of another 
student, a teacher, or the school administration in general.  Depending on the nature of the 
                                                          
142 Williams, supra note 137.   
143 Specifically, when one envisions tragedies in a school setting, the horror that occurred at Columbine High School 
is often in the forefront of one’s mind.  On April 20, 1999, the Colorado high school was the scene of a shooting 
rampage by the deeply disturbed, and now infamous, student duo of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold.    Although it is 
theorized today that the pair’s rage was fueled by greater psychotic vengeance, peer bullying also factored into the 
young men’s devastating act.  See Curtis Wilkie, The Depressive and the Psychopath: At Last we Know Why the 
Columbine Killers did it, SLATE, Apr. 20, 2004, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/2004/04/the_depressive_and_the_psychopath.html.     
144 Wheeler, supra note 28.   
145 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).   
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criticism, this could rise to the level of a material disruption to the school environment, by 
drawing attention to the critique or by inviting other students join the “speech” or “speaker” in 
his views.  In assessing the speech, it must be clear to the fact finder that a reasonable student of 
a similar age (or even a reasonable person of any age) would find the speech insulting.  In the 
alternative, if it was meant in jest, would an individual of a similar age be able to construe it as a 
joke and the intent was not serious?  Furthering the inquiry: what is the forum of the speech and 
how accessible is it to others?  If, for example, speech was created on a Facebook wall, many 
students may have access to it just by being in the same “network,” because they attend the same 
school.  Or is the speech on something akin to a blog, where access can be restricted and only 
certain selected (perhaps by the author) students can view?  What is the quality of the speech?  
Was time spent detailing specific threats or potential future incidents of bullying or was the 
speech just a brief outcry against an immediate school occurrence?  In addition, to whom was the 
speech directed?  Is there more of a reason to protect against student-on-student cyberbullying as 
opposed to student-on-teacher/administrator?  As between a cyberbullied student versus a 
teacher, one cannot weigh heavier than the other, in terms of whom the school should provide 
more protection, as both could have a substantial impact on the school’s learning environment.  
While the focus should, at all times, remain on protecting the students, the court must consider 
the teachers and administrators safety as well.     
In the second factor, the courts must consider the purpose of the speech.  In exploring the 
purpose of the speech, evidence that a student-made website was accessed while at school, 
through a school server, or that the intended audience was the students of the school, can lead to 
the finding that the speech is on-campus in nature.
146
  If one of the purposes of the student 
speech was to have an audience of other students, then it should be within the school’s discretion 
                                                          
146 J.S. ex real v. Bethlehem Area S.D., 569 Pa. 638, (Pa. 2002).  
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to punish the off-campus speech, as it is clear the student intended to disseminate a view with a 
goal of disruption in mind.
147
  
The online publication of the speech on the school grounds may lead to a widespread lack 
of respect, diminishing the credibility of the learning environment or incite fear and create worry 
by allowing one student to spread a message of hate and intimidation about another student or 
teacher.  The counter-argument to this will of course be, perhaps that the student was just 
attempting to share a joke or a point of view.
 148
  The purpose and the true intent behind the 
speech must be examined within the context of a reasonable person’s interpretation, while at the 
same time continuing to be mindful that no threat should be underestimated given the current 
state of the educational system and the violence that has occurred in the past.
149
  
Next, the court should inquire whether there a causal connection between the 
cyberbullying and Internet speech to other school issues or behavioral problems rendering speech 
clearly retaliatory?
150
  The purpose of the student speech may also be evinced by the student’s 
intent in creating the speech.  The court needs to determine if the speech was posted as a joke, a 
rebellion, or perhaps a protest against the actions of a peer or the school district.  Further, the 
dissemination as informed by privacy settings and accessibility of the content may also give 
clues as to the purpose of the speech.  The ability of others to have access to the internet speech 
and the likelihood that others will see, along with the general question of who these other 
                                                          
147 See e.g. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, rehearing en banc, 650 F.3d 
205, 212 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, K., concurring), aff’g 496 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).  Justin Layshock 
initially only allowed his friends access to the fake MySpace profile; when word spread others requested to be 
linked to the site as well, a fact that arguably shows that the student desired an audience for his speech.   
148 Id.  For example, in Layshock, Justin Layshock admitted that he used a school computer to access the fake 
MySpace profile in an attempt to disable the site.  This post-creation action was used as evidence that it was clear 
Layshock was only joking and he further realized that his “joke” had gotten out of control.  
149 See Wilkie, supra at note 143 and text accompanying.   
150 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 212.  The school punished the student in question (Justin Layshock) for a dress code 
violation only months before he made the fake profile at issue.  Id.    
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individuals are (friends, school officials, the community, or anyone in the world), are critical in 
answering this question.   
Third, one must consider the “voice” of the speech and question from a societal point of 
view, whether this is the kind of speech the American public deems worth of protection.  For 
example, if the student is acting in opposition to a school district practice,
151
 could the speech be 
construed as a form of political expression or an expression of freedom from some type of 
oppression?  Generally, speech furthering a political expression or an expression of freedom is 
one that the First Amendment was specifically designed to protect and is entitled to the ultimate 
protection.    
Finally, the finder of fact must consider if stifling this student speech is chilling to First 
Amendment rights or the essential expressions that fosters the growth of a young mind.  This 
factor also will assess, in part, the negative further-reaching consequences of allowing the 
student speech to exist in its current form.  It would be useful, at this point, for the court to 
consider the impact of the speech on the community and school moral, or even the credibility of 
the educational profession in general.  Perhaps this is a factor that is best assessed in terms of the 
societal effects of allowing or disallowing the student speech.  The goal of many school districts 
is to raise and educate good citizens
152
.  Thus, the court should consider the importance of that 
goal, without becoming too far attenuated from the issue (the impact of cyberbullying) at hand.     
4.  Part II:  How Should the Court Deal with the Definitional Problem of the 
“Schoolhouse Gate”? 
                                                          
151 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008).   
152 While possibly farther than the immediate future, it may be important for the finder of fact to consider the 
potential impact the speech may eventually have on the American workplace as a whole.  By setting specific 
behavioral and speech expectations with students in the present, it may be difficult to attempt to predict how the 
students will then act and carry these goals over into their adult lives.  By instituting the practice of tolerant 
Interaction early, however, perhaps future generations of Americans will live in a cyberbully-free world or at least 
one where the consequences of their actions are clearly known not matter the content of the Internet speech or the 
location of its creation.    
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Although it now seems that speech occurring outside the schoolhouse gate is no longer 
barred from the arm of school discipline, some of the reasoning used by the Third Circuit in the 
recent cases makes it apparent that the location of the speech’s creation is a component that the 
court should consider in making its ultimate decision on whether the speech is susceptible to 
punishment.  The majority in Layshock admitted the fact that it is “now well established that 
Tinker’s ‘schoolhouse gate’ is not constructed solely of the bricks and mortar surrounding the 
school yard.  Nevertheless, the concept of the ‘school yard’ is not without boundaries and the 
reach of school authorities is not without limits.”153  The Layshock court particularly expressed 
concern of the “unseeingly and dangerous precedent” which could be created by allowing the 
state, through the arm of the school, reach into a student’s home and control the child to the same 
extent the child could be controlled at school.
154
  Thus, the Third Circuit adopted the position 
that schools could punish the expressive conduct “that occurs outside the school, as if it occurred 
inside the ‘schoolhouse gate,’ under certain very limited circumstances,” none of which were 
identified in the instant case.
155
  Given the examples the court cites, the limited circumstances 
seem only to be categorized as student Internet speech promoting disruptive conduct or issuing 
threats upon specific individuals.
156
   
                                                          
153 Layshock v. v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 276 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, rehearing en banc, 650 F.3d 205 
at 242 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, K., concurring), aff’g 496 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).  Because Justin was 
sitting in his grandmother’s house at her computer when he created the page, the court found that, “allowing the 
district to punish [this] conduct . . . violated the First Amendment guarantee of free expression.”  Id. at 277.  Simply 
because the speech “wound up” in the school through other students attempting to access it was not enough, with the 
court asserting the relationship between Justin’s conduct was too attenuated.  Id. at 276.   
154 Id. at 277.   
155 Id. at 253.   
156 See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002)(school could punish student for creating website 
off campus explaining reasons why a teacher should die frightened students and parents and caused the teacher to 
take a medical leave, 3 substitute teachers called in disrupting the student educational process); see Wisniewski v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F. 34 (2d Cir. 2007)(student’s off-campus created drawing of a 
teacher being shot and the words ‘Kill Mr. VanderMolen,’ which he sent to 15 students through instant messenger, 
also off campus, was punishable as it was deemed reasonably foreseeable that the image’s transmission would 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school); See also Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 
2008).   
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Instead, the Supreme Court should update this piece of the test, with the aim of defining 
the schoolhouse in more modern terms, perhaps even considering what composes the “virtual 
schoolhouse,” moving the boundaries to reflect the modern technological realities that exist.157  
For example, in California, a district court decided that speech-forum (where the speech was 
created) and who eventually had access to the speech was much more important than the 
geographic origin of the speech, meaning the location where the speech became “live” in terms 
of social media access.
158
  Next, it is no longer feasible for courts to aver that student speech 
created at an off-campus computer, but later accessed from a school computer is not punishable.  
Courts should uniformly recognize that on campus access of off-campus speech creates a 
foreseeable risk of a substantial disruption to the school environment
159
 for two reasons.  First, 
on campus access creates an immediate potential for distraction, disobedience and negative 
response to the speech-target; and second, because the speech and the cyberbullying it 
encompasses have crossed the school grounds at the precise moment of access.  
Similarly, it seem preposterous that when Justin Layshock went on to the MySpace 
webpage he created from a school computer and changed the settings,
160
 it did not constitute an 
action, such as a re-publication, which occurs on-campus and within the schoolhouse gate.  This 
mandates that the test, in light of the digital age, must now examine when a digital action starts 
or begins in time, potentially almost as if one were examining the action under stimulus-response 
theory.
161
  In a stimulus-response setting, the theory of conditioning deems a response followed 
                                                          
157 See Daniel, supra note 28 at 624.  Daniel further explains how cyberbullying in certain cases, “yield[s] the power 
to communicate private aspects of [students’] li[ves] to the entire global Internet community.”  Id.   
158 See J.C. ex. Rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills School Dist., 711 F.Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cali. 2010).   
159 See J.S. ex real v. Bethlehem Area S.D., 569 Pa. 638, (Pa. 2002). 
160 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, rehearing en banc, 650 F.3d 205, 242 
(3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, K., concurring), aff’g 496 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).   
161 The core of the “Behaviorism” school of thought espouses the view that learning processes can be studied most 
objectively when the focus is on stimuli and responses.  See J.E. ORMROD, HUMAN LEARNING, (Prentice Hall, 3rd ed. 
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by a reinforcing stimulus is strengthened and more likely to occur again.
162
  With respect to 
emails and texts, there is a distinct time of sending and a time of receipt—when, at that moment 
the specific message “hits” the reader and is absorbed by him or her.   
MySpace and Facebook,
163
 on the other hand, are more like the technological equivalent 
of living organisms—changing, growing, and having the ability to have its user manipulate it to 
respond.  The profile, once formed, changes in a manner that does not fit easily in a stop-and-go 
schema, unless we isolate each little change, post, tweet, and tag.  But even if we do isolate each 
minute action, the change to the MySpace profile in Layshock would then fall within the bounds 
of Tinker as one little piece of creation occurring within the school grounds.  The point of a 
social media profile is not its initial creation, it is what the user then does with the profile: how 
he or she nurtures it, grows what it contains (photos, comments, posts), and raises it to become a 
manifestation of him or herself in an online capacity.   
The argument that an opponent of this theory, for example, a student challenging a 
disciplinary action levied by his school administration, may raise in objection to this, is that a 
back and forth conversation or interaction of wall/blog posts may create individual catalysts for 
action, abuse and bullying.  Thus, Twitter, AOL instant messaging, GChat, Facebook Chat, and 
messenger programs may fall more in the “middle” of this analysis and the balancing of interests.  
In other words, each post, re-post and response may be an action having an ending point in time 
and space, but this might complicate the analysis.  After all, an online conversation, although 
done through wireless channels, is a dialogue none-the-less.  These dialogues can last for days, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1999).  Typically learning is described as a stimulus and response relationship, with the classical expression of this 
theory being B.F. Skinner’s fundamental principle of operant conditioning.  Id.   
162 Id.   
163 See Bajin, supra at note 72 and text accompanying.   
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months or even years, fostering the environment where some claim to form online 
“relationships” and even develop online personas.     
Isolation in this particular manner, however, does not seem necessarily feasible or 
realistic when social networking is considered in a realistic context.  Friends frequently urge 
each other to become parts of social network
164
 and upon choosing to submit, an individual 
creates a profile, which they then grow and raise from its online inception or birth.  The point of 
any social medium is to stay connected, update, change, disclose, give TMI,
165
 and the like as 
one’s interests change and tastes evolve.  The online “self” is then projected and permitted to 
connect with others as a means of keeping up to date and networking.
166
  It is possible to isolate 
every small change, but one must question if it makes sense in the context of the whole online 
identity and the over-arching purpose of social networking on a general level.  The purpose of 
social networking is to have an ongoing, relevant, living representation of oneself  “out there” in 
the cyber sphere that changes as “you” the individual changes.  This broadly phrased concept is 
something that can be understood by nearly all, especially students who reside in the peer 
pressured, highly image-driven world of secondary education.   
The Court should also consider the causal connection between the time and space of the 
activity and the school district or student regardless of the “physical space” where the bullying 
occurs.  The court might have its analysis informed by a litany of factors, which may have 
                                                          
164 See ENOUGH IS ENOUGH, FOUNDATION FOR MAKING THE INTERNET SAFER FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 
Cyberbullying Statistics, http://www.internetsafety101.org/cyberbullyingstatistics.htm, (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).  
The foundation reports that 85% of the parents of youth aged 13-17 report their children have social networking 
accounts, frequently signing up because their friends joined.  Id.     
165 “TMI” is a common slang acronym for the words “Too much information.”  See generally 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/tmi (online definition incorporates the concept that American youth who use social 
media are now part of a culture of ‘over-sharers’ who feel the need to necessarily divulge every detail of their 
personal lives online).  Examples of TMI might, on any given occasion include: what someone had for breakfast, 
their anger at a recent failure of a school exam, a declaration of personal emotions or feelings for a significant other 
etc.   
166 See generally John Suler, The Psychology of Cyberspace: The Disinhibition Effect, (Aug. 2004), 
http://users.rider.edu/~suler/psycyber/disinhibit.html#trueself.   
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recently occurred, for example: did anything happen between the school and the student such as 
punishment, or a prior disciplinary event?
167
  What were the student’s actions the date of the 
creation?  The court should take into account whether or not the speech’s purpose was in fact to 
retaliatory, regardless of whether or not it was against another student, teacher, or the school 
itself.  If the purpose was retaliatory, or can be inferred as retaliatory, this clearly implicates a 
situation where the school district should be afforded the chance to monitor the student’s 
behavior.  By allowing a student to lash out at a peer or the school district through an off-campus 
Internet forum without the fear of punishment, the school in a sense concedes that it will permit 
students to potentially disrupt the school environment without the fear of punishment.  Before 
long, the students, who may have been using the Internet forum as a means of expressing a form 
of 1st Amendment protected “political” speech, will simply be allowed to claim and misapply 
the shelter of this provision, even when the speech serves no legitimate political function or is 
merely a piece of vulgar, violent, or threatening speech hidden within the guise of a “political” 
message.   
 It is important within this categorical analysis to also consider if there was any change to 
the online content of the speech over time.  If the student changed the online content/post/tweet 
after the dissemination (such as making it private or limiting the audience
168
), the court would 
need to assess how many students may or may not have already seen the content.  For instance, if 
the student “self-limited” the speech or stopped its spread for fear of punishment, one could 
argue that this already shows that the environment was affected.
169
  Further, an altogether 
                                                          
167  See Layshock, 650 F.3d 205 at 212.   
168 Id.  at 213.   
169 For instance, it seems to follow that a student’s fear of punishment must be grounded in their own firsthand 
knowledge of the school’s disciplinary system; the fear of what could happen if the conduct, in this case the speech, 
were discovered.  Because the student’s fear is of this punishment, under a system which he presumably understands 
in operation, it can be inferred that he must then also know that since he anticipates and fears punishment that he 
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removal, although not dispositive of the student exhibiting remorse, could potentially have the 
evidentiary significance that the fear of punishment coupled with the post “getting out of hand” 
weighs heavily in the favor of the environment being affected by the speech.  Finally, it should 
be considered when (in time), if at all, the school forces the student to take down the Internet 
speech, as the removal itself might be considered an event.  When Justin Layshock was unable to 
remove the fake profile, he simply left it available to be viewed on MySpace.
170
  Justin’s further 
act, even though beginning as an attempt to correct a wrong, is an act which not only shows a 
wanton disregard of the commotion he had already caused, but could arguably be seen as an 
event of “speech” itself.  Wanton speech left-posted, adding to a school disruption and done from 
a computer lab computer,
171
 should be punishable.   
In the final outcome of Layshock, the court of appeals decided that schools can punish 
student speech which rises to the level of cyberbullying and which is outside the schoolhouse 
gate in a limited context.
172
  While the court specifically uses the phrasing, “certain very limited 
circumstances,”173 it offers no further definition.  In order for the Court to provide more guidance 
to the application of this terminology, these “circumstances” must be explored as part of this test 
and examples should be provided.  Guidance for this piece of the test’s inquiry will be supplied 
by the considering whether or not the lewd or offensive speech was meant to be a “parody,”174 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
has, to some extent, disrupted the school’s disciplinary system or materially interfered with the learning environment 
in a way that precipitates discipline.   
170 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 213. 
171 Id.   
172 Id. at 242. 
173 Id.  The court explains why it seemingly “punts” in this case as to defining the parameters of when the arm of 
authority can reach past the school house gates, but seemingly only because the school district did not appeal the 
lower court’s ruling.  Id.   
174 Layshock, 650 F.3d 205 at 242, n.27 (the court felt the issue turned on whether the school district could punish 
the student for his expressive conduct outside of school and whether or not it was parody did not matter).   
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however it should be noted that even a parody,
 175
 if significantly vulgar or seemingly 
threatening, may be grounds for justified discipline.
176
 
Next, another consideration for the “context” of when speech can be punished or not may 
be able to arise from an examination of the student’s first amendment rights, specifically, the 
protections contained within rights themselves.
177
  One point which needs to be emphasized, is 
that although this proposed test mandates the balancing of student interests against those of the 
school district when it comes to online speech, one should remember that the goal of any school 
district is ultimately to protect its students in such a way that encourages the most positive 
learning environment.  Further, school districts should also be viewed as guardians of privacy, in 
that they have the ability to protect students from bullying and the choices that students may 
make in response to bullying, especially if the student is a member of what is considered a 
minority group (legally or within the school district itself).  The finder of fact should then, 
instead, construe the school’s ability and discretion to punish as properly interacting with and 
ultimately safeguarding student rights, not diminishing them.   
For example, in a district court case from Wisconsin, an openly gay student was deemed 
to have a right (grounded in her First Amendment free speech rights) to wear a pro-LGBT shirt 
to school without fear of the school district punishing her and thereby informing her parents of 
her sexual preference.
178
  While the court did in fact conduct a type of balancing in the Nguan 
                                                          
175 A generally accepted legal definition for parody is “a reproduction or representation of a literary or dramatic 
work in structure with changes in the names of characters, also in the situations represented, usually for the sake of 
comedy.”  18 Am J2d Copyr § 105.  Generally, the reproduction contains changes intended to create humor.  
BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, 3d Ed. (2010).   
176 See J.S. ex real v. Bethlehem Area S.D., 569 Pa. 638, (Pa. 2002) (violent parody resulting in absence of teacher 
rose to the level of something that was punishable).   
177 Meaning, what student freedom of speech and expression rights are most consistently recognizes by schools, 
even outside the context of Internet speech and what affirmative steps do schools take in order to balance the 
protection of these rights with the school’s legitimate interest in a fundamental learning environment.   
178 Nguan v. Wolf, 517 F.Supp.2d 1177 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (the court held that the student had a right of privacy with 
regard to her parents knowledge of her sexuality, so long as certain factors were met; for example, that she limited 
public display of affection with her girlfriend).    
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case,
179
 it should be seen as an example of how even though a district might ultimately not have 
the ability to punish a student, the overall goal is protecting certain vulnerabilities from harm in 
the most efficient and beneficial way possible.   
5.  Confronting Problems with Practical Solutions 
The proposed solution, while requesting change, should not be construed as if it is urging 
the Court to overrule Tinker.  The Tinker test, as it exists, is a time-tested means of balancing 
interests, and serves as the basis for the proposed new formulation.  The words and 
recommendations advocated for herein are simply cautious recommendations and updates and it 
must be clear that this comment is not advocating for the court to necessarily overrule the test.
180
      
Recently, two federal courts have held that a school cannot intervene based on every 
student’s right to a free public education (with the thought being that punishment for off-campus 
speech deprives students of this right), unless the cyberbullying is truly violent or threatening in 
nature.
181
  Although in these cases, the court in its reasoning found that a substantial disruption 
could be found if the cyberbullying speech was part of a larger pattern of behavior overtime,
182
 
this reasoning and the resultant ruling are insufficient in justifying punishment and insufficient to 
protect students from the mental and psychological strain cyberbullying causes.  If one adheres 
to the this line of reasoning, essentially the law is saying that the cyberbullying must be violent 
in nature or reoccurring frequently before the school will step in.  Although this predictive 
                                                          
179 Id. at 1180.  
180 It is apparent from the Supreme Court’s denial to certify either Layshock’s case or Kowlowski’s, that the Court 
has yet to deem the time right to analyze or reformulate the Tinker analysis.  See Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex 
rel. Snyder, 11-502, 2012 WL 117558, *1 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012) (denying also the Layshock’s case and Kowalski’s 
4th Circuit Case).  Given certain Court preferences for judicial conservatism and the more fundamentally more 
cautious, incremental changes in the law that necessarily follow, it is the most prudent course of action that the 
Tinker test not be over-ruled, but simply adjusted, updated, or given a new judicially constructed application to fit 
the internet era.     
181 See J.C. ex. Rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills School Dist., 711 F.Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cali. 2010); Wisniewski v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).    
182 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40.     
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construction of the law—as the speech first breaching a threshold of violence before deemed 
punishable—is a more extreme result, it should not be overlooked as a potential outcome.  Given 
the widespread use of internet media as a means of student communication and cyberbullying—
it is no longer feasible to adopt a policy of “wait and see,” when “wait and see” has too often 
turned into “too little too late.”  It is to late for Jamey, Phoebe, Ryan, and Alexis, but their fate 
need not befall the countless other would-be victims: sitting behind computer screens and 
contemplating ending their lives because of cyber-torment which school districts are not willing 
or able to end.   
The Court will undoubtedly weigh the speech in favor of a substantial disruption if the 
speech has the ability to pull a school administrator away from his or her normal duties to 
address the speech.
183
  Due to the growing reports of students affected and harmed by 
cyberbullying, the stakes are heightened and a school should not have to wait until the online 
speech crosses the aforementioned threshold.
184
  For example, speech has also been found to be a 
substantial disruption if it causes the absences of a targeted teacher.
185
  Although it would be 
difficult to determine if the speech causes the absence of a student, as an overarching 
consideration, any speech that is threatening or violent should be considered a substantial 
disruption, as it has the power to disturb not only the target student, but those around him once 
the bully’s cyber-speech inflicts the student past a certain extreme.  Too many students and their 
respective educations have been negatively impacted, learning environments destroyed, and 
young lives lost to wait until the speech crosses the threshold into the realm of “punishable.” 
IV.  IN THE ALTERNATIVE: SOLUTIONS RELYING IN INTERNAL POLICY AND 
LEGISLATION 
                                                          
183 See Mordis v. Hannibal, 684 F.Supp.2d 1114 (E.D. Mo. 2010).   
184 A certain level of the disruption’s severity need not be attained if the speech proves to be potentially harmful at 
the outset.   
185 See J.S. ex real v. Bethlehem Area S.D., 569 Pa. 638, (Pa. 2002). 
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A.  Educate, Train, Repeat  
While an update to the Tinker speech test is needed, a potential alternative course of 
action is to train and educate students on the many facets of bullying, with a special focus on 
cyberbullying.  Instead of merely setting up a regulatory scheme of punishment that can be 
meted out at the school district’s discretion, education may instead take the form of policies in a 
student handbook, a factor that also might be considered in balancing the interests.  The school 
however, will still need guidance as to the substance of handbook policy language and whether 
ultimately policies should regulate only on-campus speech.  Adding this element would establish 
a clearly defined “when” and “where.” Applied pre-emptively, this could stop many of the 
common type occurrences of cyberbullying.   
By giving specific examples after articulating a comprehensive normative standard (so as 
not to be facially unconstitutional for vagueness)
186
 a school district has the ability to take a 
preventative standpoint rather than one that is purely reactionary to student behavior.  By being 
reactionary instead of preventative, the school district is arguably allocating more power to the 
student unnecessarily, and allowing them to have a say as to what controls behavior instead of 
the school administrators.   
The school district must also consider the method(s) of implication of a preventative 
policy.  Some school officials feel that a school district should begin indoctrinating its students 
about the issues of anti-cyberbullying at the youngest age possible.
187
  Individual instructor and 
administrator trainings should first focus on aiding the faculty in identifying both cyberbullying 
and student-best-practices, with a district wide implementation program closely following.  In 
                                                          
186 See J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, (3rd Cir. 2011).  In formulating its answer, even though the court 
fails to adopt an updated test, it provides guidance on how to structure, school policies so they are not overly broad 
or void for vagueness.  Id.   
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such a district-wide program, students collaboratively (on a small scale in their classrooms) and 
collectively (through school-wide programs and assemblies) learn what constitutes the school’s 
adopted anti-bullying policies, which are then widely disseminated amongst a school population 
and easily understood.
188
  Educators and parents alike fear, however, that U.S. schools are 
already past the point of no return.  A pre-emptive strike against a cyberbullying problem that 
has already reached monumental destructive capacity may be too little too late.
189
  While it is not 
foolish to hope that policies adopted for a new generation of students will have the desired 
impact of reducing cyberbullying, another way to cope with the growing confusion on the laws 
application is for lawmakers to specifically issue mandates as to the scope of the school district’s 
discretion in punishing the behavior at issue.   
B.  Leave it to the Lawmakers  
A more viable solution would be the adoption of specific legislation, whether state or 
federal, to address the growing concerns surrounding cyberbullying and detail the discretionary 
powers of discipline school districts can have.  This grant of authority would then define the 
limits of what can be punished and would need to surmount generalities and get to the core of the 
problem as well: can student speech be punished when it is done off campus, and in what 
circumstances can it be punished?  One problem with this solution is that even if laws are 
adopted similar to those that have been seen in other states, this does not necessarily conclude 
the issue surrounding the jurisprudence.  The court’s standard defining what speech can be 
punished has the potential to remain vague, as students may attempt to still bring claims that the 
school district, while conducting itself within the bounds of the new law, did not accord with the 
principles set forth in the case law regarding student First Amendment rights.   
                                                          
188 Id.   
189 See infra Part III.A.5.   
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 C.  Best Practices  
Out of all the solutions proposed above, the seemingly most plausible explanation is the 
solution that addresses the problem in the best way is a combination of a new court decision to 
be put on the books and in the meantime, state and local laws be promulgated that aid school 
officials in implementing anti-cyberbullying programs.  While of course it is always interesting 
to note the opposing views that have already been proposed, one must distinguish this solution 
from some which promote ideas that are essentially disturbing and antiquated. 
Several existing scholarly works or supposed research studies seem to suggest that 
student internet speech could actually be a self-regulating mechanism
190
 and that it is natural for 
students to want to “vent” at each other, with the internet and social networking providing the 
perfect forum to do so.
191
  Perhaps the notion behind this disastrous suggestion is correct—and 
society wants to believe that the younger generations will learn from their mistakes and be able 
to evolve into mature members of their respective communities.  But the reality is that secondary 
students’ involvement with the cyberbullying, which is consistently in the public eye, has 
reached proportions of severity (if not in numbers) that no longer can go unchecked or self-
checked.  The over-optimistic outlook that kids will simply vent and have the awareness of when 
speech crosses into dangerous territory is outmoded by the maliciousness, undergirding the 
reality of many student online interactions.   
V.  PRACTICALITY AND PREDICTIONS 
A.  Problem and Answer: The Usefulness of the Reformulated Test to Practitioners  
It is, of course, necessary to address any questions that the proposed solution of an update 
to the Tinker test might leave.  One of the most foreseeable questions that will be raised by such 
                                                          
190 Student Comment/Anonymous, FACEBOOK AND OTHER STUDENT TECHNOLOGY MISUSES, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 
89, 90 (2010)   
191 Id. at 98.   
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a proposed update to the Tinker test is the notion of constant technological advances and 
changes--consumers often joke about how one cannot even remove certain technology products 
from the retail shelf without the immediate threat of being obsolete.  However, this matter is of 
course far more serious and drafters must consider the solidification and implementation of a 
policy that is applicable to such rapidly changing technology.  Any new judicial test, law, or 
school district policy must be able to compete with the growth of social media.  The classic 
example to this is the constant “updates” and changes to Facebook192: those evaluating and 
making such policies must be willing to re-evaluate frequently and students must be willing to 
adapt.   
While Facebook users might half-heartedly complain about the change in how status 
updates are projected or the consistent changes to their privacy settings, other conniving students 
might see this as a loophole to evade a school policy that may be based on a proposed test.  A 
clever manipulation of how the actual cyberbullying is accomplished may be just the way (or 
perhaps a quick way) to get around a carefully crafted test—bringing society right back to where 
it began.   
The counter to this, however, is that once the broad new re-envisioning of the Tinker test 
is put in place (in the form of a law or perhaps judicial test), it will allow school administrations 
much more discretion (within reason) as to how they will administer the law in their own 
districts.  This does not mean giving carte blanche to punish, but this allows the school board or 
central office the capacity to create any provisions within their own cyberbullying policies that 
will allow for the facilitation of the national or state law.  It should also be noted that this would 
perhaps be the best way and the best circumstances to administer “student pre-emptive/teaching” 
of the policies—as school districts comply and make updates or changes to their existing 
                                                          
192 Supra note 128 and text accompanying.   
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policies, keep students and parents informed by having mandatory sessions where students must 
learn and become familiar with the updated policies and sign a code of conduct or letter of 
understanding that the policies were introduced and explicated for them.
193
   
Another potential outcome/threat to this structure may be the nagging insistence of 
certain critics that parents have the duty, means, and ultimately right, as conferred by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to raise their children
194
 and reasonably included in the concept of child 
rearing is the monitoring of student online activity.  This argument however overlooks the fact 
that while parents may be in the best position to individually monitor their child’s respective 
activity; the school district is ultimately in a better position to monitor and control inter-student 
online behaviors.    
If this issue does in fact get granted certification in the context of another case, it will be 
helpful to predict how the justices of the Robert’s Supreme Court may rule on the issue, based on 
past rulings and political inclinations and leanings.  Specifically, it will be interesting to note a 
possible prediction based on Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence in Morse in which he opined, 
“that this is the far reaches of what student speech permits.”195  Some theorists and scholars have 
said that this quote proves that Alito favors more protectionist measures for student speech and 
he would most likely favor a provision which restricts the discretion of school districts in 
punishing speech, leaning more toward support of the students.
196
     
Lastly, there are a few other pieces of the puzzle that may be interesting to consider in an 
attempt to formulate the most cohesive solution possible.  There is also the continuing notion that 
                                                          
193 Another interesting solution in general is perhaps having students serve on advisory boards/work with the 
administration to develop policies that are most applicable to students and put into terminology that student’s can 
best comprehend.  By drawing student “leaders” from a variety of backgrounds the district can make sure that the 
input is balanced to a degree and more likely to be accepted and adhered to by a broader range of students.   
194 U.S. CONT. amend. XIV, § 3.   
195 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  Alito’s concurrence was joined by Kennedy and may perhaps be 
indicative of his view as well.   
196 See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1052 (2008).   
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some scholars note that the cases most frequently cited deal with student on adult violence and 
not student on student, which was the case in both Layshock and J.S.
197
 Finally, there is the 
possibility in some cases that criminal punishment can be meted out in response to 
cyberbullying, however this is rare and normally the bullying must rise to the level of 
harassment.   
VI.  CONCLUSION:  MODEL BEHAVIOR, CELEBRITY STATUS, AND THE TENTATIVE 
NEW HOPE  
  The Tinker test, while still functional in some contexts, is in desperate need of a 
renovation.  One need only look to the number of students who still affirm they feel bullied 
online by others in their school community to recognize that Tinker is no longer workable.
198
  
The exigency of the situation is thus determinative upon the fact that cyberbullying is not going 
away, its not being quelled, and if continued to be left unchecked, the horrifying results that 
happened to Ryan Halligan, Phoebe Prince, Alexis Pilkington, and Jamey Rodeymeyer will 
become even more prolific.   
While this comment ultimately argues for school districts to have the ability to punish 
off-campus cyberbullying speech, it is not an avocation for the intrusion upon all student-speech.  
Students must be allowed to express themselves in a healthy way, even if it is the controversial 
proclamation of a sexual preference, idea, or belief.  It is the peer reaction of death threats, 
wishes, and violence, which must be ended.  It is imperative that if American parents, students, 
administrators, and every citizen alike do not want to live in a society that construes loss of a 
young life through internet-induced peer cruelty, the law, in some capacity must step-up and lay 
                                                          
197 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, rehearing en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (Jordan, K., concurring), aff’g 496 F.Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007); J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915, (3rd Cir. 2011).   
198 See That Facebook Friend Might be 10 Years old, and Other Troubling News, CONSUMER REPORTS MAGAZINE, 
June 2011, available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2011/june/electronics-
computers/state-of-the-net/facebook-concerns/index.htm.  The survey reports that “one million children were 
harassed, threatened, or subject to other forms of cyberbullying” on Facebook over the past year.  Id.   
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down a concrete law or test, or, perhaps more efficiently, redefines the loose terms of the 
existing test once and for all.
199
  It was too late for Ryan, Phoebe, Alexis and Jamey.  But its not 
too late other would-be victims of cyberbullying, who, though cowering behind their computer 
screens, still might be persuaded to step back from the ledge.   
                                                          
199 See Daniel, supra note 89.  It is also of note that many articles have, as early as 2009, claimed that the Supreme 
Court will soon make a final judgment in this area.  See REVIEW OF CASES AND CONTROVERSY, 8 UNC FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 86, 90 (2009).  Hopefully, no one was holding his or her breath on this one, as a decision has yet to 
even have been certified to be decided by the land’s highest court, with this last refusal in January being the most 
recent court denial.     
